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SYNOPSIS
When expressway and roads coexist, it is necessary
to establish a reasonable traffic share between them.
It may be practiced by the regulation of toll-rate of
expressway. But at an occasional traffic congestion,
the reasonable share is disturbed, so that some
traffic control means should be taken. In this paper,
we deal how to control inf lows on expressway, from a
viewpoint of the optimal share between expressway and
roads. The minimization of total travel cost in a
system is aimed under traffic equilibrium conditions.
The problem is formed as a two-stage programming
model, and a simple example solving the problem is
showed.
1. INTRODUCTION
So far, the traffic control on expressway mainly aims how to
dissol ve speedily the traffic congestion caused by an accident. But
nowadays, natural traffic congestions freequently occur on expressway
with the increase of traffic demand. Accordingly, it becomes to be
necessary to control inflows on expressway.
When inflows are limited at interchanges, the traffic flow on a
parallel road increaes, and traffic congestion on it becomes
intensified. For this reason, the limitation of inflows on express-
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way may not be allowed, if traffic congestion gets worse. It may be
allowed only if the social benefit is improved through the contol. We
aim the minimization of total travel cost in a network instead of the
promotion of social benefit.
By the way, the direct control of inflows is not practical under
present facilities of expressway and operations of traffic in our
nation. A possible way is to control inflows indirectly, through the
control of the number of open booths. On the other hand, expressway
users may decide their behaviors on informations offered by the
traffic operator of expressway. In this case, users will act such
that their utility is maximized or their loss is minimized. So that,
the traffic operator can decide the optimal control strategy, taking
into account user's behavior. This can be considered as a two-person
game, in which the traffic operator have the initiative and can decide
the optimum strategy ahead of users.
2. FORMULATION
Now we consider a network which consists of an expressway, such
roads that are sUbstitutive for expressway and cross connections with
expressway. As traffic demands, we take into account only those
concerned with expressway. Other demands are treated as fixed values.
In order to simplify, a kind of vehicles is assumed.
road
:.............. inflow link
Fig.l An Example of Expressway and Road Network
Let denote
sij:demand from i to j,
Xijp:flow on route p from i to j,
rijpk=l:if link k is contained in route p from i to j
O:otherwise,
Cijp:toll rate on route p from i to j.
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We devide the set of 1 ink into two sets. One is the set of inf low
links to expressway and the other is the set of other ordinary links.
The former is represented by L i and the latter is by La. It is
assumed that the travel time on a ordinary link k is a monotone
increasing function of link flow, denoted by Tk=fk(Xk ). On the other
hand, we assume that the travel time on inflow link k is a function of
both capcity Yk and flow Xk , denoted by Tk=gk(Yk'Xk ).
Inf low 1 ink capaci ty depends on the number of open booths, but we
assume it as a continuous variable for convenience. The travel time
on a inflow link represents the delay caused by queues at toll-gate.
It should be monotone increasing for flow and monotone decreasing for
capacity. The flows which enter from interchanges out of control area
are trated as fixed values. The fixed flows on link k is denoted by
XkO ·
Now we assume any user acts such that his travel cost is minimized.
As travel cost, we take the sum of the value of travel time and toll-
rate on the route. Then the distribution of flows, on a network under
given inflow link capacities, is obtained through traffic equilibrium
conditions. That is the solution of the following optimization
problem(l), (2).
minimize J(y,x)
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Xk
+ v L J gk(Yk,X)dX +
kELo 0
L XijpCijp
ijp
( 1 )
for x, sUbject to
Xk = L Xijp'rijpk + XkO
ijp
LXijp = Sij
P
Xijp f, 0
Itk
Itij
Itij,p
(2)
(3)
(4)
Where v is the average time value.
On the other hand, we assume that the traffic operator controls the
number of open booths such that user's total travel cost is minimized,
taking into account user's route choice behaviors. As travel cost, we
take the total value of time loss and toll-rate on a network. Then,
user's total travel cost is represented by
F(y,x)
where,
(5)
Itk (6)
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Inflow link capacity Yk should be under less than the supremum 9k'
which is equivalent to the capacity when all booths are opened, so
that
o £ Yk ~ 9k
The traffic operator
links, taking into
keL i (7)
can decide on the optimum capacitiy of inflow
account user's route choice behavior.
On the other hand, user's can not know the strategy of traffic
operator. They merely decide their behaviors on informations provided
by the operator. So that the traffic operator has an init.iative in
this two-person game, and can take the optimum strategy ahead of
users. Whence, this problem can be formed as the following two-level
optimization problem (3).
F(y*,x(y*)) min F(y,x(y)) (8)
y
sUb. to
o ~ Yk ~ 9k
J(y,x(y))=min J(y,x)
x
sUb. to
Xk = L: xijp'rijpk+ XkO
ijp
L:xijp = Sij
P
Xijp ~ 0
\fk
\fij
\fij,p
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
Where, y* is the optimal solution for inflow link capacities, and x(y)
is the parametric optimal solution of the inferior problem
corresponding to given inflow link capacities y. Clearly x(y) shows
one-to-one. correspondence, so that if the inferior problem is
feasible, an equilibrium solution, Le. the stackelberg solution
exists.
This two-level optimization problem may be solved by the following
algorithm.
(1) Select an feasible initial value y(l), and set n=l.
(2) Solve the inferior problem for x under given capacities yIn).
(3) Compute the gradient of objective function of the superior
problem, using the optimality conditions of the inferior problem.
(4) Solve the superior problem, using the gradient. Write yIn) for the
optimal solution. If Ily(n)-y(n-1) 11< E:, then stop. Otherwise, set
n=n+1, and go to step (2).
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3. EXAMPLE
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Fig.2 Network for Example
Now, we consider a simple network illustrated in Fig.2. Link 1 and
2 are inflow links and the other are ordinary links. We take into
consideration traffic demands only from node 3 to 4 and from node 1 to
2. Flows with respect to other 00 pairs are fixed. For each 00
pairs, two routes by expressway and by road are considered
respectively. If these routes are balanced in travel cost, the
equilibrium conditions for the inferior problem are represented by
x121 +x122 = 812
x341+x 342 = 8 34
V(T2+TS+T7+T10)+c121
V(T1+T3+T4+TS+Tg)+c341
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
These equations may be considered as simultaneous equations of
route flows, so that implicit functions
x 121 h 1 (Y1'Y2)
x122 h 2 (Y1'Y2)
x341 h 3 (Y1'Y2)
x342 h 4 (Y1'Y2) (18)
exist. The partial differentials of them are expressed as follows.
1 1
o 0
o
1
T'5
T '+T'+T'+T'+T'lx 3 4 5 9
o
1
o
-1
o
o
o
-T 'ly
(19 )
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dX121
-1 l
1 1 0 0 0
dY2
dX122
0 0 1 1 0---
dY 2 (20)
dX341 T '+T'+T'+T ' -TS T' 0 -T '---dY2 2x 5 7 10 5 2y
dX342 T' 0 T'+T'+T'+T' -T6 0---dY 2 5 3 4 5 9
Where,
dTk (kELo ) ,
dTk dTk (kELi)Tk=dX T '=-- T '=--
k kx dXk ky dYk
On the other hand, the total travel cost is represented by
F = v[(XIO+x341)T1+(X20+x121)T2+(X30+x341)T3
+(X40+x341)T4+(XSO+x121+x341)TS+(X60+x342)T6
+(X70+x121)T7+(XSO+x122)TS+(X90+x341)T9
+ (X100+x121)T10 (21)
If implicit functions (1S) are substituted into (21t, total travel
time F becomes a function of Y1 and Y2' denoted by F (Y1'Y2) _ The
gradient of F is given by
where,
XT '+A-1 ly (22) X T '+ A-2 2y
dX121
~
dX122
ay;-
dX 341
dY2
dX 342
dY 2
(23)
A (24)
Then, we can compute the gradient of the evaluation function F, from
(19), (20), (22 ) and ( 23) _
The optimality conditions for the superior problem are as follows_
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ali' < 0 (if Yk=Yk )aYk
0 (if O<Yk<Yk ) (k=1,2)
~ 0 (if Yk=0)
(25)
If Yk < Yk and aF/aYk < 0, then total travel cost may be decreased
by expand of the inflow link capacity. On the other hand, if Yk > 0,
and aF/aYk > 0, then we can not reduce total travel cost by increase
of the inflow link capacity. In this case, we may take inflow
restriction strategy at that interchange, through the restriction of
the number of open booths.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
An inflow control model on expressway was dealt on optimal traffic
share between expressway and roads. It was assumed that any user acts
reasonably, so as to minimize his travel cost under given conditions.
This is valid, if informations with respect to traffic congestions and
travel times are offered to users quickly and accurately.
The model proposed is still conceptional. There are some problems
to use practically. One of them is how to calculate in case of large
network. The other is how much does the control produce effects on
total travel cost. These are the present pending questions.
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